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Abstract 
Although the analysis of the contemporary crisis in Europe has many different aspects, 
this paper will limit its scope to the issue of economic policy. The euro is not just a 
currency − it is a mechanism. Its introduction has established a particular form of 
symbiosis among different capitalist economies. The project of euro must be grasped in 
systemic terms: this mechanism amounts to a particular organization of economic 
strategies and forms of political power. It is therefore meaningless to criticize the 
putative irrationality of the policies implemented; it is necessary, rather, to unmask their 
innate social logic. Mainstream economic discussions focus on the problem of moral 
hazard and set it as a fundamental strategic target of policy making. In the context of the 
contemporary version of euro area, this emphasis leads to policy making regimes in 
which austerity is the only way to deal with economic imbalances. In other words, 
austerity is offered as alternative to economic instability. What is urgently needed is a 
progressive prospective on policy setting that overrides this unfortunate trade-off. The 
paper will address this issue from the viewpoint of (international) political economy. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Half a decade has passed since the subprime market financial meltdown, which was 
the onset for the Euro Area (EA) crisis. The European project has been entered its 
second, less optimistic phase. The stylized facts of the first phase have been widely 
discussed during the last years, not always in an illuminating or coherent way. Cross-
country differentials in growth and inflation, persistent current account (or financial 
account) imbalances, real effective rate appreciation (mostly for countries with 
current account deficits), and the setting up of a leveraged and highly integrated 
banking system were the most striking developments. For those who have followed 
the past debates about the crisis of the ERM (Exchange Rate Mechanism) of the 
European Monetary System (EMS),1
 The EMU (European Monetary Union) is a sui generis monetary union: one 
without a central authority possessing the typical characteristics of a capitalist state. 
Two other points about the EMU are also worth mentioning. First, the EMU sets up a 
context of symbiosis that elevates default risk to secure austerity. Second, it must rely 
on the elimination of moral hazard as the only way to let different capitalist 
formations be governed according to the neoliberal agenda, aggressively promoting 
thus the interests of capital. Official responses must not block the functioning of 
financial markets, even during the crisis; they must exist only with the status of 
complementarity to markets (see the analysis in the Appendix and also Sotiropoulos et 
al 2013). 
 all these events may give a feeling of déjà vu; 
nevertheless, both the protagonists and the stage (the institutional framework) are 
different this time, although we have not seen the final act yet. Given the character 
and the long history of the euro project and given its nature as a mechanism for 
organizing the interests of capitalists, anticipating its demise is not a safe bet. 
Nevertheless, it is also obvious that the same project has lost its historical momentum. 
 The paper revisits and challenges the theoretical roots of the mainstream 
political responses to the crisis. It also sets the background for the discussion of an 
alternative anti-austerity context. This debate is crucial since Europe is in the midst of 
an institution building process. 
 
2. The two narratives about the crisis: a context of discussion 
 
The two different viewpoints about the crisis can be presented with the help of the 
following balance of payments identity. To simplify things, we shall assume that 
current account balance CA is identical to trade balance (NX). 
                                                          
1 See Sotiropoulos (2012) and Sotiropoulos et al (2013; Ch. 6 and 10). 
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( ) PBSSCANXGICY FH ++=≡=++−     (1) 
 
Let us focus on the right side of the identity. SH is the net savings of households, SF is 
the net savings of firms and PB is the public budget, which is in turn the net savings 
of the public sector. Net savings are equal to net capital outflows which increase 
residents' holdings of foreign liabilities. It is obvious that if net savings become 
negative, this amounts to net capital inflows from abroad. 
 
2.1 The post-crisis official narrative: the case of reflective causality 
 
The post-crisis official narrative argues that when an economy faces current account 
deficits (or reductions in its surpluses), it is a sign of 'imprudent' and 'reckless' 
domestic behavior both of private (firms and households) and public sectors. In this 
sense, the EA current account imbalances are a 'bad' macroeconomic development 
and must be corrected. It must be emphasized that the pre-crisis official explanation of 
the very same phenomenon was radically different. Current account imbalances were 
welcomed as the optimum means to support and accommodate the catching-up 
process between the European 'core' and 'periphery.' Relevant and further reasoning 
on this discontinuity in the official narrative can be found in Sotiropoulos et al (2013: 
184-6). However, just to highlight the point, even in March 2008 Trichet, the ECB 
president, ensured that "the fundamentals of the euro area economy remain sound and 
the euro area economy does not suffer from major economic imbalances" (cited in 
Mayer 2012: 100). 
 The post-crisis official narrative gradually targeted the economies in deficit as 
solely responsible for the imbalances because of private sector dis-saving, public 
sector dis-saving, or both. This is a highly moralistic kind of reasoning, suggesting 
that these economies are 'profligate', ‘reckless and ‘incontinent‘ living 'beyond their 
means.' This is the result of a particular reading of the causality in the above balance 
of payment identity (1): let us say it favors a reflective causality. Negative CA (or NX) 
is seen as aggregate consumption (living standards) that exceeds the productive 
capacities of the economy (C+I+G > Y). This can hold for either of two reasons. 
Either overborrowing from abroad boosts domestic demand at levels that overtake 
productive capacity Y; or, alternatively, it masks the structural gaps in competiveness 
and productivity. In this sense, 'cheap' finance or risk mispricing is the necessary 
closure of the narrative. 
 Therefore the suggested cure for the rebalancing of negative current account 
positions is domestic deflationary policies in the deficit countries (asymmetric 
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response in the context of EMU). This in turn means curbing of wages and public 
spending (public benefits) and the privatizations of public goods (fiscal 
consolidations). Imbalances are 'bad' on the part of deficit countries or at least sub-
optimal and therefore attacking interests of labor must be the proper economic 
response. The resulting policy mix must reflect the neoliberal agenda. Recession is 
seen as the proper way to bring profligate countries back to the path of economic 
virtue. We clearly deal here with a recession-led political agenda. The logic is 
described by Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1 
The misinterpretation of the EA crisis 
 
 
 
2.2 An alternative explanation: the case of a structural causality 
 
An alternative political agenda must be associated with an alternative explanation. 
This is a crucial political issue and not a hair-splitting debate among academics. The 
above post-crisis official argument fails to capture the dynamics of contemporary 
capitalism. This is because it treats the financial side of the balance of payments 
identity as passive reflection of either the trade balance or the autonomous investment 
decisions of private and public agents. This is a line of reasoning that neglects the real 
workings of modern finance. 
 The alternative explanation must take into account two basic points.2
                                                          
2 For a relevant discussion see Sotiropoulos et al (2013). For a mainstream intervention with a similar 
perspective see Turner (2013). 
 First, the 
financial account has its own autonomy and does not simply fill the gaps of the 
current account trends. Second, the financial account imbalances create their own 
dynamics both in surplus and deficit countries. In the case of a monetary area with the 
characteristics of the EA, the market-based rebalancing is very likely to take the form 
of a typical balance of payments crisis (because of a sudden stop in financing). This 
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outcome actual fits to the facts of the EA crisis. Thus, the financial side of the story 
should not be underestimated, even more so, in an era of significant cross border 
financial flows. It also gives another dimension to the discussion. Current account 
imbalances set a vulnerable symbiosis between economies in surplus and deficit. It is 
a problem whose roots and consequences concern the pattern of economic symbiosis 
along with the institutions that hold the symbiosis together.3
 To illustrate the point, we shall reformulate the identity (1) as follows: 
 
 
net capital inflow = net imports    (2) 
 
Causality in this identity is a structural one: It is defined by the dynamics of capitalist 
development and the way this development is reflected in market experience. In other 
words, by the way it is represented from the viewpoint of risk. This means that there 
are no straightforward functional relations between the two sides. 
 In a historical project like the EA, combining countries with different growth 
prospects, financial account imbalances will necessarily develop.4
 
 This is a condition 
that makes participation in a monetary union appealing to capitalist powers of both 
less and more developed capitalisms. However, this leaves net imports as the 
adjustment variable in the above equation. Ceteris paribus, net imports (or the trade 
balance in general) is the factor that is more likely to accommodate the financial flows 
of capital in the context of catching-up (growth and profit rate differentials) than vice 
versa. Trade imbalances and REER (real effective exchange rate) divergence were the 
results of the process of European symbiosis: it is a weakness that pertains to the 
whole setting and is linked to strong capitalist development in deficit countries. 
3. On the political importance of the theoretical debate 
 
The discussion about the causality of the balance of payments identity has important 
political consequences. 
 
3.1 Reflective causality and the devaluation of labor 
 
                                                          
3 For a more elaborated discussion of the same argument see Sotiropoulos et al (2013), Milios and 
Sotiropoulos (2010), Milios and Sotiropoulos (2013). 
4 During the pre-crisis period cumulative changes in sovereign debt were usually unimportant (see 
Appendix). The amount of sovereign debt depends on growth prospects within the EMU and the 
character of domestic economic policies. Countries with high debt and high growth prospects can 
easily accommodate tax relief for capital without deterioration in the debt dynamics. This was one of 
the basic results of the first face of EA. 
6 
 
The argument which sees the financial account imbalances as flexible adjustment to 
the corresponding trade imbalances, albeit its alternative versions, is in fact a labor 
devaluation project. The macroeconomic rebalancing concerns the economies in 
deficit which must proceed with some sort of asymmetric adjustments, reducing the 
international value of labor. More or less this point summarizes the official EA 
strategy of dealing with the crisis: recession-led neoliberal reforms. The primarily 
asymmetric type of responses which have been implemented so far (the burden of 
adjustment falls heavily on the distressed economy) are in line with the neoliberal 
governance of the EMU 5
 
 (emphasis on moral hazard) and they rather use the 
sovereign debt as a means to austerity (lower taxes for capital and privatizations) and 
devaluation of labor (better conditions for capitalist exploitation). In this sense, they 
are economic policies which are genuinely designed to miss their declared fiscal 
targets but retain as strategic horizon the 'sustainable' reorganization of the economic 
and social life to the benefit of capital. This is the message of Figure 2. It depicts the 
changes of the last three years (the numbers for 2013 are estimations) in unit labor 
costs, sovereign debt and unemployment for the economies of the EA (except 
Luxemburg). What is presented by the state and European officials as a story of 
success is actually as story of disaster. 
Figure 2 
Changes in (nominal) unit labor costs, sovereign debt (per cent of GDP) and 
unemployment in relation to final demand for 2010-2012, EA countries 
 
  Source: AMECO database (my calculations; data for 2013 are estimations) 
                                                          
5 For an exposition of the argument see the analysis in the Appendix. 
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Economic recession (reduction in final demand) is used as means for imposing 
favorable conditions of capital valorization (it reduces unit labor costs and REER and 
boosts exports in relation to imports − the ultimate end is to reshape the social 
conditions of labor reproduction), but it increases debt and unemployment. At the 
same time, debt overhang is also used as means for fiscal consolidation and further 
neo-liberalization of the capitalist state. In a midst of a recession, a country with a 
current account deficit cannot put its sovereign debt on a sustainable track by solely 
relying on labor devaluation and fiscal consolidation: these actions will not be 
sufficient to generate sovereign net savings and reduce borrowing costs. A possible 
current account rebalancing based on asymmetric responses by a deficit country will 
extend over a long period. This means a prolonged period of recession or poor 
economic growth, which will also be associated with a severe deterioration in the 
living conditions of the population and the quality of the democracy. This is not so 
much a re-adjustment but a conservative social reshaping led by an authoritarian state 
interference. 
 European governments and the ECB have been proved unwilling so far to do  
‘the right thing in time’ in order to decisively mitigate the consequences of the crisis. 
There are institutional limitations but this is a poor excuse and it downplays the 
important room for policy actions which still exist even within the current context of 
EMU. As we discussed above, it is a mistake to interpret this behavior as 'irrational' or 
'short-sighted.' The drastic intervention into the crisis would undermine the usage of 
debt overhang and economic recession as tools for the devaluation of labor. It would 
undermine the strategic rule of moral hazard as a governance model to the benefit of 
capital since it would create the real 'hazard' of blocking austerity and neoliberal 
reforms. It is exactly this event that from a class point of view must be considered as 
irrational for the capitalist power.  
 Without going into details, what we should expect in the near future is the 
application of the same rule: policy responses always one step behind from the 
workings of markets. Despite its contradictions, this process can secure the final target 
of European capitalism: the formation of the 'white Chinese worker' in the EU. 
Possible future plans and financial innovations (banking union; debt restructurings, 
bay-backs and write-offs; redemption bonds, safe bonds, or even Euro bills etc.) will 
not be designed as solutions to the misery of the working people but will just serve 
this single strategic scope. The real issue in the European crisis is not the 
contradiction between North and South, nor that between debtors and creditors but the 
fundamental contradiction in capitalism: the one between capital and labor. 
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3.2 The single currency with the different tiers 
 
The agenda of recession-led reforms has generated different tiers within the same 
currency area. This is the ultimate consequence of austerity: different euros according 
to the particular economic geography. It is not by chance, that the hardcore 
proponents of extreme austerity even fantasize a return to the national currencies. 
 Figures 3 and 4 below highlights the major financial developments at the 
macroeconomic level. In brief, different financial conditions in different parts of the 
EA have generated different borrowing costs and banking conditions. This is quite 
obvious in the case of ECB bond purchase program and liquidity provision (co-opting 
banks into securing funds for fiscal distressed governments): liquidity seeks for safe 
havens, eventually flowing to the core economies as it is obvious from the deposits 
drain and the cumulative TARGET2 imbalances. 
 
Figure 3 
          Deposits flows (In billions of euros)6           USA Money market fund claims7
 
 
Source: BIS (2012) 
 
The different tiers within the EA undermine the results of the ECB monetary 
interventions (which are very cautious, indeed: ECB is more concerned with the issue 
of moral hazard, which is the cornerstone of the European governance model − see 
Appendix). This is illustrated in Figure 5 which shows the relationship between the 
growth of domestic demand in the past three years and fiscal austerity. Core EA 
economies with less vulnerable financial and banking sectors (or with national central 
                                                          
6  Cumulated inflows of deposits from households and private non-financial companies ver the 
preceding 12 months. 
7 Claims on euro area banks of the 10 largest US prime money market funds as a percentage of their 
assets under management. At end-2011, these 10 funds held $644 billion of assets and all US prime 
money market funds held $1.44 trillion of assets. 
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banks) are close or above the benchmark line that presents a fiscal multiplier of 1.0. 
On the contrary, countries with greater financial and banking distress (the countries of 
European periphery and Netherlands) have seen demand perform more poorly than 
would have been expected on the basis of fiscal policy alone. This fact highlights the 
direct and indirect effects of financial stress on the size of the fiscal multiplier and 
demonstrates the co-existence of different euros within the EA. ECB monetary policy 
is not expansionary enough and it is implemented in a context that undermines its 
effectiveness having significant effects on demand growth. 
 
Figure 4 
 
 
Figure 5 
 
 Source: JP Morgan, Europe Economic Research, 28 May 2013. 
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3.3 Structural causality and the need for an anti-deflationary agenda 
 
The agenda of depression-led reforms across Europe is based on a wrong theoretical 
explanation of the crisis. It is political project that gradually reshapes the economic 
and social context of the EA to the benefit of capital: it totally reorganizes the 
conditions of reproduction of labor power. In doing so it creates different monetary 
tiers within the EA: different geographically specified euros. It thereby undermines 
what it claims to be its basic target: the unity and singularity of the common currency. 
 The anti-austerity agenda needs an alternative theoretical explanation from the 
orthodox one, that emphasizes the financial character of contemporary capitalism. It 
sees EA contradictions as a result of a particular form of symbiosis and it addresses 
the problems on the European level. It sets forth an agenda that defends a symmetrical 
expansionary adjustment that destroys the different tiers within the EA. It is not just 
another technocratic suggestion but a different perception of the economic policy and 
the responses to the crisis. 
 The paper will not get into the technical details about alternative plans. It will 
close with an observation from the historical past of the European continent. Let us 
recall Polanyi’s (2001) major insight as it was expressed in 1944. In a historical 
context bearing many similarities to the contemporary one, he argued that liberalism, 
when in crisis, needs a kind of ‘conservative interventionism’ in order to reproduce 
itself. I believe that Polanyi’s insight still holds its strength. In our era, capitalist states 
do not seem so helpless, not even the European ones. They intervene in a decisive 
manner to restore the dynamics of the markets and to finance the building up of 
mechanisms and institutions to further squeeze social incomes and public benefits 
(reshaping the terms of the reproduction of labour power). The resulting situation 
seems to be that of a free economy under a strong government (or strong governance 
in the case of EU), as Polanyi might have put it. The key target of contemporary 
capitalist strategies is the subordination of the stability of employment and incomes to 
the successful functioning of financial markets. An unstable and dichotomized social 
regime seems to be the fruit of this process. However, this ‘authoritative’ type of 
intervention obviously indicates that there are many different solutions to the debt 
overhang. The conservative state intervention does not cease to be an 'intervention' 
inventing all the necessary mechanisms and institutions that may be used for a 
different policy mix. 
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Appendix: the EA as a sui generis monetary union8
 
 
A single currency area is not identical with a zone of fixed exchange rates. One usual 
mistake in the relevant discussions is the following: many scholars seem to think that 
Euro Area (EA) states just peg their national currencies to the euro as if the latter was 
a mere foreign currency. This assumption usually leads to the most grotesque 
explanations. Nevertheless, the euro is the national currency of every member state of 
the EA. It is a national currency of a peculiar kind. It is a currency without traditional 
central banking. And this is a major change, at least for the bigger economies of the 
EA (such as Spain or Italy). In what follows we shall explain the logic of this unique 
situation. In particular we shall explain why: 
 
• The EMU (European Monetary Union), by imposing more discipline to the 
neoliberal project, has become more vulnerable to crises (elevated sovereign 
default risk); and, 
• The emphasis on “moral hazard” is so crucial for the neoliberal agenda in the 
context of EMU. 
 
A.1 More discipline in exchange for more instability: the dangerous trade off in 
the case of the euro 
 
In the usual nation state setting, a single national fiscal authority stands behind a 
single national central bank. In plain terms, this means that “the combined fiscal-
financial-monetary resources of the fiscal authority and the central bank must be 
sufficient to provide the central bank with the resources it requires to fulfill its role as 
lender of last resort and market maker of last resort and to meet its macroeconomic 
stability objectives” (Buiter 2008: 9). As we know, this is not the case with the EMU: 
there is no solid and uniform fiscal authority behind the European Central Bank 
(ECB). Member states issue debt in a currency which they do not control in terms of 
central banking (they are not able to ‘print’ euros or any other type of currency, at 
least not for a considerably long period of time9
                                                          
8 This section draws heavily upon Sotiropoulos et al (2013; Ch.10). 
). In this context, governments will 
not always have the necessary liquidity to pay off bondholders. Financial stability can 
be thus safeguarded only through fiscal discipline, i.e. through preserving fiscal 
policies within the neoliberal corset. 
9 Under the Emergency Liquidity Assistance (ELA) – integral part of the European System of Central 
Banks – national central banks can in exceptional circumstances provide liquidity (against collateral) to 
distressed credit institutions under terms which are not publicly disclosed. During the recent crisis this 
liquidity channel was put in motion with the cases of Germany and Ireland as the most indicative 
examples. 
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 This should not be taken as a real sacrifice on the part of sovereign states. On 
the contrary, it is considered as a welcome condition for the organization of neoliberal 
strategies, because the disintegration of the welfare aspect of the state is now the only 
route to financial stability. Nevertheless, this institutional arrangement comes with a 
serious cost, a danger that the old discussions with regard to the EA strikingly 
underestimated. The economies of the EA have voluntarily subjected themselves to 
elevated default risk.10
 When a government with a large amount of foreign-currency denominated 
sovereign liabilities faces a change in the “mood” of the markets
 Let’s focus for the moment on this particular question. 
11
 For European citizens this story might well give a sense of déjà-vu. It bears a 
striking resemblance to their current condition. The example of a state with a large 
debt in a foreign denomination resembles (but it is not identical to) the fiscal 
conditions of the EA. 
 – that is, a re-
pricing of risks associated with its assets and liabilities, possibly expressed as a 
sudden freezing of the inflow of capital (a liquidity crisis, let’s say) – it will 
experience an explosion of debt servicing costs on the foreign currency and the 
derailment of its budget balance. This is bad news for debt sustainability (and 
financial stability). The government must immediately tighten fiscal policy in the 
midst of a recession (an economic recession is likely to be the result of such risk 
revaluation since the terms of state borrowing reflect the terms of private borrowing), 
communicating to the markets its ability and willingness to continue servicing its 
foreign debt. The government has to convince the markets that it can secure a social 
consensus to the neoliberal corset; or, in other words, policy makers must ensure that 
they can impose fiscal prudence in the way markets dictate it, according to the 
mainstream line of reasoning (securing the interests of capital). Such policies, in the 
midst of a recession, are not unlikely to lead to a severe crisis. In the case of a 
monetary union like the EA, the significant financial interconnectedness of the 
member states raises fears of contagion which is also reflected upon the distressed 
governments. As mentioned many times in the relevant literature, this is a vulnerable 
macroeconomic setting, prone to a self-reinforcing and self-fulfilling type of 
sovereign debt crises. 
Things would not necessarily be this way if the economies of the euro zone 
had not abandoned their former national currencies. In this hypothetical case, a 
moderate exodus from the government bond market would cause a manageable 
devaluation in the exchange rate without undermining the liquidity conditions of the 
economy. Foreign investors would get rid of the sovereign debt but they could not 
                                                          
10 For this argument see Kopf (2011: 2). 
11 At this stage of our analysis we are not interested so much in the roots of this shift in the perception 
of markets. 
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take the national currency equivalent with them. Financial intermediaries with foreign 
debt would feel some pressure but the quantitative easing window (i.e., according to 
the contemporary expression, the printing of money) put forward by the central bank 
could alleviate the pressure thus satisfying the liquidity preferences of the financial 
sector. But even in the extreme case of financial distress, the national central bank 
could simply ‘print’ money (this is a notional electronic transaction), thereby lending 
directly to the government in order to prevent sovereign default. We have to note that 
this is one possibility among others and holds mostly for the larger economies. This 
possibility is not so strong in the case of smaller economies (like Greece, Ireland and 
Portugal). 
 By adopting the euro as their new common currency, the participating 
countries (i.e. their ruling classes) have made a ‘dangerous’ choice. They have 
voluntarily curtailed their capacity to deploy meaningful welfare policies, subjecting 
themselves at the same time to a high degree of sovereign default risk. This has turned 
out to be a risky trade off. A moderate exodus from the sovereign debt market (i.e. a 
moderate risk re-pricing) now distorts the liquidity conditions in the economy and 
leaves the state with only one path: fiscal tightening, high interest rates, recession, 
debt un-sustainability, crisis, and default. Economies that face liquidity problems in 
their sovereign debt markets may not go all the way down this path (given the policy 
responses at a European level) but, in any case, recessionary policies are the only 
route suggested by the existing shape of the EA. If sovereign states are massively 
caught by the unfortunate spin of this vortex, crisis is just the other way to implement 
the neoliberal strategies, more unorthodoxly and violently this time. European states 
have voluntarily placed themselves in a predicament where markets can actually force 
them into default but this is an issue within the European policy setting. 
 
A.2 EMU and moral hazard: the triumph of neoliberalism 
 
We have seen so far how the states of the EA have subjected themselves to a high 
degree of sovereign default risk. This was a development underestimated by the 
architects of the euro. On the other hand, a much more frequently discussed issue was 
the restriction of public debts. We shall not go through all the discussions that gave 
birth to the so-called Growth and Stability Pact. We shall just focus on its principal 
logic. 
 We have to stress once more that as regards the disciplining of state policies to 
the neoliberal corset the key-issue is not the level of public debt or deficit but the way 
markets interpret the connection of these fiscal variables with the other crucial 
parameters of debt dynamics (growth rate, interest rate, primary balance). Hence, the 
disciplining process contains two crucial moments: the whole configuration of debt 
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dynamics and the pricing of involved risks by markets (which, of course, is based on 
a particular representation of reality given the institutional background). It was pretty 
obvious from the beginning that the context of the euro could possibly ‘confuse’ 
market supervision, making room for potential fiscal expansion contrary to the 
dominant neoliberal spirit. There are several reasons for this, some more important 
than others. For one thing, European bank regulation put a zero capital charge on all 
EU sovereign debt, prefiguring the subsequent narrowing down of interest rate 
spreads. This means that commercial banks could borrow in the wholesale market at 
Euribor and then buy European sovereign debt, gaining the spread as risk-free profit. 
The return on this carry trade was extraordinary, pushing the market to underestimate 
some of the risks involved in the sovereign indebtedness. We could mention more 
examples.12
But the basic issue was that markets, being aware of the financial 
interconnectedness within the EMU, felt sure that no country would be left to default 
since such an event would have wider economic implications for the EA. Indeed, until 
2008, the markets put all sovereign debt pretty much on the same footing, narrowing 
down the spreads. Of course the difference in the interest rate spreads cannot be solely 
explained in terms of institutional reasons. Long term interest rate spreads also 
capture the overall country specific risk: that is, the growth prospects within the 
particular institutional setting. In this sense, the convergence of the long term interest 
rates of Greece and Germany reflects the growth differentials when the latter are 
considered within the context of EA. 
 For instance, the ECB lent cheap to the commercial banks, accepting 
sovereign bonds as collateral with the same quality. In other words, the ECB justified 
by its actions the negligible risk differentials. 
 Nevertheless, this seems like a serious limitation to the disciplining 
mechanism of markets. To use market language, the context of EMU also elevated the 
risk of moral hazard. Without some ad hoc regulation, there were not enough 
incentives either to prevent governments from issuing too much debt or to take the 
necessary measures to deal with it. This condition could be seen as giving some space 
for the implementation of welfare policies. Nevertheless, it did not. Markets might be 
unable to supervise the sovereign states ‘efficiently.’ It was the invention of the 
Stability Pact that was designated to solve the problem. This pact explicitly banned 
every type of bail out and deprived the ECB of the right to buy sovereign debt on a 
regular basis. It made the euro an international currency without the backing of a 
traditional central bank. Moreover it posed an artificial ceiling on the public debt and 
public budgets: since financial stability was to be secured by fiscal tightening, and 
since the euro symbiosis would not let markets properly impose fiscal disciplining, 
                                                          
12 See Kopf (2011: 4-5). 
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there emerged the need on the part of capitalist power to politically impose ad hoc 
fiscal rules and forms of political supervision. Their key-role was to supplement 
markets in their overseeing duty. If markets were unable to price sovereign risk in the 
EMU properly, then explicit political regulation would have been necessary to solve 
this problem by imposing appropriate rules. Nevertheless, when it comes to the 
relations between sovereign states the strict application of these rules cannot be taken 
for granted. 
In any case, the structure of EMU (market supervision and the Stability Pact) 
did provide a context for the control of public finances and, aside from some minor 
violations, succeeded in tightening them in line with the demands of the neoliberal 
model. This is pretty obvious if we take a quick look at the dynamics of debt. Let dt 
be the amount of sovereign debt at year t, pdt the primary deficit for the same year 
(expenditure before interest payments minus revenues), gt the nominal growth rate, it 
the implicit interest rate and, sft the stock-flow adjustment. All these variables are 
expressed as ratios of GDP. Then from the fiscal balance identity we can easily 
receive the following equation: 
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The equation can be approximately rewritten as follows: 
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In brief, given the level of debt dt-1 the above expression measures the contributions to 
the debt dynamics of several factors: pdt is the annual contribution of primary deficit 
(a positive primary deficit adds to the debt); it·dt-1 is the contribution of the interest 
payments (they add to debt); -gt·dt-1 is the contribution of growth (higher growth 
means lower debt); sft is the contribution of the stock-flow adjustment. Figure 6 
shows the cumulative changes of these variables for the first phase of EA, namely the 
period 1995-2007 (we exclude Luxemburg from our sample). 
Despite the post-crisis official viewpoint, the first period of the EA succeeded 
in controlling the dynamics of sovereign debt. Even in cases like Greece and Italy, 
which carried sovereign debt much higher than the arbitrary Maastricht threshold of 
60 per cent, the factors that contributed to the increase of debt in each case were 
(more than) counter-balanced by factors pushing in the opposite direction. For 
Belgium, another over-indebted case, the total contribution of the above factors was to 
decrease the debt. All these developments were steadily accompanied by the 
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implementation of neoliberal policies that favored reductions in public expenditure 
and promoted tax relief for capitalists and wealthy households. From this point of 
view, the first phase of the EA was consistent with its own targets: disciplining state 
policies to the agenda of neoliberalism without putting debt on unsustainable track. 
Note that for the majority of cases, including the so-called extreme case of Greece, the 
contribution of the primary deficit was negative (for this particular period European 
states ran cumulative primary surpluses). 
 
Figure 6: Cumulative contribution to debt for 1995-2007 (per cent of GDP) 
 
Source: AMECO database, my calculations. 
 
 The official fears that the institutional setting of EMU might give rise to 
‘profligate’ and ‘imprudent’ elements in the fiscal policies were right but in the wrong 
direction. The most interesting finding from Figure 6 is the following. For pretty 
much every country in our sample, positive and negative tendencies to debt dynamics 
were by and large balanced. This means that overall levels of sovereign debt were not 
significantly changed. It was mostly the contribution of growth that counterbalanced 
interest rate payments (in an environment of decreasing interest rates) and made room 
for neoliberal fiscal policies. In other words, given the level of growth and the 
increasingly favorable milieu for interest payments, the debt did not decrease to the 
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Maastricht levels because of neoliberal tax relief to the benefit of capital and wealthy 
individuals. Greece is the most indicative example in this line. For Greece, strong 
growth, combined with the reduction in the borrowing costs, left the sovereign debt 
ratio intact at the level of 100 per cent for the whole period under examination. The 
major cause was the shortfall of revenues in relation to the expenditures, regardless 
the so-called inefficiencies in the state apparatus (which of course are not Greece’s 
prerogative). Figure 7 suggests that this result holds for the other EA countries as 
well. 
 Chart 7a suggests that the implicit interest rate, although more rigid than the 
nominal long term interest rate, hinges heavily upon capitalist growth.13
 
 This implies 
that the interest rate on existing debt is endogenous to growth and follows its trend. 
Higher growth in the context of the EMU was translated into lower overall borrowing 
costs. Chart 7b has also the expected shape: as a general rule, we see that the higher 
the growth contribution to the decline of debt, the higher the cumulative primary 
surpluses. But this fact was not due to an increase in revenues. Quite the contrary, it is 
evident from charts 7c and 7d that higher (cumulative) growth was accompanied by 
lower (cumulative) fiscal revenues and expenditure. This finding means that higher 
growth in the context of declining borrowing costs (in the frame of the EA) did not 
endanger the neoliberal principle of reduction in public spending (‘less state’) while it 
did gave room for substantial tax relief to the benefit of capital and rich people as is 
indicated by the lower levels of cumulative revenues. In fact, the EMU setting 
provided a strong basis for the materialization of the most offensive neoliberal 
agenda. If there was any profligacy at all, this was due to the tax relief enjoyed by the 
top social strata. From this point of view, those who analyze the recent fiscal crisis in 
the EA as the result of irrational binge are right, indeed, but for a different reason. 
There was a binge but the working class was not invited. In that case the rules of 
savoir vivre were broken… 
A.3 Moral hazard and market discipline 
 
After the start of the 2008 financial meltdown, European officials, along with the 
participating governments, were faced with a very difficult puzzle: first, how to deal 
with the enormous economic problems and contradictions without undermining the 
neoliberal context of the EMU; second, how to create proper policy mechanisms for 
intervening in the mess, turning the crisis into a chance for further boosting of the 
neoliberal agenda; third, how to set up new rules to overcome the vulnerabilities of 
                                                          
13 Here we treat the group of EA countries as panel. We are interested to isolate the general trend 
despite the different institutional settings that holds for any single country in particular with regard to 
sovereign debt dynamics. 
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the past without negating the conservative edifice of EMU; fourth, how to correct the 
problems while avoiding the ‘overcorrection’ that would make room for the 
implementation of social welfare policies in the future; finally, how to use the 
tremendous fire power of the ECB without turning it into a ‘traditional’ central bank. 
 
 
Figure 7: Factors contributing to increasing indebtedness in relation to growth (or 
growth contribution to debt, all variables are expressed as percentages of GDP), EA, 
cumulative changes for 1995-200714
 
 
Source: AMECO database, my calculations. 
 
                                                          
14 We have excluded Luxemburg from sample. Ireland has also been excluded from a, c and d. This 
does not change the message of the charts. 
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 It would be pointless to revisit the episodes of the EU summits or to speculate 
on what may happen in the near or far future. The European capitalist powers have 
jointly decided to exploit the current crisis so as to extend the neoliberal agenda. And 
since the EMU is not an integrated political union, in the light of the above reasoning: 
the capitalist responses to the crisis have necessarily to be complementary to the 
functioning of the markets. If not, the markets cannot play their disciplining role and 
the central authorities are unable to mandate the neoliberal reforms. In plain terms, 
interference with the market in the context of the EA would block or undermine the 
role of modern finance as technology of power. Figure 8 illustrates this result and it 
must be read in contraposition to Figure 7. 
 Of course, the macroeconomic behavior of an economy is very likely to differ 
with respect to the underlying economic phase. Chart 8a does not imply any radical 
change in the endogeneity of the implicit interest rate, given of course the shift in the 
pricing of risk by markets (implicit interest rate responds mildly to the perspective of 
the markets, since it concerns all the outstanding debt). The same holds for chart 8b. 
But the explanation for the latter is now very different during the recession years, 
since the contribution of (cumulative) growth is rather positively linked to 
(cumulative) revenue and expenditure in charts 8c and 8d. This is exactly the opposite 
of what held for the pre-crisis years. It justifies the principle of austerity in the context 
of the EA: the crisis (low growth) is by and large being used as a means to further 
neo-liberalize state governance. Given the inelastic parts of public expenditure and the 
lower tax incomes, recession is now approached and used as a tool for further 
reductions in total expenditure and further relative fiscal burdens to labor. This is the 
result of the abovementioned type of governance: official responses complementary to 
the role of the markets. In other words, austerity has been rendered the major 
economic policy for developed European capitalist formations. Of course, all these 
observations describe the general trends which depend also on the results of class 
struggle. 
 The commentators or analysts who blithely criticize European leaders 
misunderstand this point. Not only do European officials always have a second and a 
third plan in reserve, but their decisions must impel the neoliberal agenda without 
violating the functioning of the markets (to the extent that these decisions comprise a 
hegemonic plan for all European economies). Otherwise the crisis cannot be exploited 
as opportunity for capital. In simple terms, aggressive neoliberal measures and 
reforms would not be implemented in the participating countries if the ECB had 
worked as a fiscal agent from the beginning, if its intervention in the secondary 
sovereign debt markets had been deeper and more persistent, if the fire power of 
EFSF or ESM had been sufficient to deal with the core needs of the sovereigns, if 
LTROs and OMT were more decisive, if the current plan for Spain had been imposed 
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on Ireland, if… The grave character of the crisis might have been avoided but in a 
totally different direction: one ensuring some protection to the living standards and 
the labor rights of the working classes. This would have been a different Europe, 
though: a Europe promoting less drastically the interests of capital. 
 
Figure 8: Factors contributing to increasing indebtedness in relation to growth (or 
growth contribution to debt, all variables are expressed as percentages of GDP), EA, 
cumulative changes for 2008-201115
 
 
Source: AMECO database, my calculations. 
 
 In brief, the European strategy for dealing with the crisis has as its main target 
the further embedding of the neoliberal agenda. It will always stay one step back from 
                                                          
15 We have excluded Luxemburg from the sample. Ireland has also been excluded from a, c and d. This 
does not change the message of the charts. 
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the ‘real’ needs of the time so as to lead states onto the path of conservative 
transformation by exposing them to the pressure of markets. This strategy has its own 
rationality which is not completely obvious at a first glance. It perceives the crisis as 
an opportunity for a historic shift in the correlations of forces to the benefit of the 
capitalist power, subjecting European societies to the conditions of the unfettered 
functioning of markets. In section 4 we shall discuss how all the already proposed 
plans fit nicely to this picture. Of course, the future of class struggle cannot be safely 
dictated... 
 
 
 
 
 
